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Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel:
How Lochner Got It Right*
JOHNATHAN SULLIVAN**
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, the Supreme Court considered the validity
of the Coal Act, a federal statute enforcing retroactive liability for coal miners'
pension funds, as applied against a corporation that had long ago stopped its
mining operations. Eschewing substantive due process as a means of enforcing
an unenumerated economic right to be free from retroactive legislation, the
Court instead declared that this application of the Coal Act was an
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. This Comment argues that
the Supreme Court's use of the regulatory takings doctrine in this context is an
illogical expansion of the Takings Clause. The author argues, further, that the
use of the Takings Clause in Eastern Enterprises to enforce an unenumerated
economic right has the potential to create a legal regime that is no better (and
which may be worse) than that created by Lochner v. New York. As a result, the
author concludes, if unenumerated economic rights must be enforced, the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, properly constrained,
are a more appropriate vehicle than the Takings Clause as construed in Eastern
Enterprises.
[T-I]e that breaks a thing to find out what it is has left the path of wisdom.
- J.R.R Tolkienl
I. INTRODUCTION
The ancients pictured fate as a weaver's wheel, spinning out the lives of men
and beasts like threads in the pattern of time. Perhaps without knowing what they
were doing, they hit upon a perfect metaphor, for it stresses the cyclical nature of
human experience.2 History repeats itself with an alarming amount of regularity,
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** I would like to thank my wife, Deanna, and my sister, Kimberly, for their love and
support In addition, I would like to thank Professor Edward Foley and Brian Kelly for
their helpful comments before and after the Note-writing process. This Comment is
dedicated to my parents, Edward and Louise Sullivan, who gave everything they had, and
never asked for any of it back.
SJAR. TOLKIEN, THE FELLOWSHP OF THE RING 272 (1954).
2 At least the image has remained an enduring one. See, e.g., ROBERT JORDAN, THE
SHADOW RISING 13 (1992) ("The Wheel of Time turns, and Ages come and pass, leaving
memories that become legend. Legend fades to myth, and even myth is long forgotten when the
Age that gave it birth comes again.'); see also STEPHEN KING, THE WASTELANDS 315 (1991)
(proclaiming that "death and treachery are... spokes on the wheel of [fate]"). The image is,
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and any student of history can relate how the events of distant civilizations in
ancient times mirror those of the modem world.3 The wheel turns and ages come
and go, but it always arrives back at the place where it started.
The wheel is, too, an apt metaphor for the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
Often, the Court rejects doctrines and theories, only to call them back from the
dead without ceremony. Examples of this cyclical disavowal and reestablishment
of doctrines fill the casebooks. 4
The jurisprudence of economic substantive due process is one such doctrine.
The Court long ago abandoned the protection of unenumerated economic rights
through the use of substantive due process; indeed, the saga of the cases which led
to this abandonment are among the most notorious in the short history of the
Constitution.5 Over the course of the last century, and culminating in Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel,6 decided last term, the Court has typically accomplished the
too, a popular one in the canon of classical literature, stretching back to medieval mystery
cycles and the works of Shakespeare, in which fortune was depicted as a woman holding a
wheel; this may have been derived from the popular legend of the three Fates, who spun,
measured, and cut the threads of life in ancient Greek and Norse mythology. See generally
ARTHUR COTrERELL, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MYrHOLOGY: CLASSICAL CELTIC NORSE (1996);
ROBERT GRAVES, THE GREEKMYTHS (1988).
3 For example, the Greens, the Reds, and the Blues, political parties of late Imperial Rome,
fought each other in political battles that, while slightly less civilized than the partisan
impeachment drama played out over the last year in Washington, are strikingly familiar. See
generally HANS JULIUS WOLFF, ROMAN LAW (1951). In addition, one need only read an
account of the lives of the emperors of Rome to realize that the shenanigans in Washington
(sexual or otherwise) are not unique to our own age. See generally SuEroNrus TRANQUILLUS,
THE TWELVE CAESARS (Robert Graves trans., Penguin 1957) (describing the lives of the first
twelve Caesars of Rome in intimate-and sometimes offensive-detail).
4 See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a Coherent
Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 333-46 (1995). Professor Levy has
noted two or three categories of such cases representing what he calls a process of
"reinvigoration and retreat." All of the doctrines that he notes are related, fundamentally, to
economic rights. First, he writes that the Court's Contracts Clause jurisprudence signaled a
reinvigoration of economic rights in the late 1970s, but was cut short. See id. at 334-35.
Second, he writes that structural doctrines like federalism and the separation of powers have
undergone a similar cycle of rebirth and disavowal. See id. at 335-37.
Levy's concept of "reinvigoration and retreat" from economic rights differs substantively
from the general pattern of disavowal and renewal mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this
Comment. The former is technical and legal, envisioning the Court's decisions as an attempt to
answer a specific legal problem; the latter encompasses the Court's jurisprudence as a response
to specific historical and sociological stimuli. Although the two may overlap at times, they are
for the most part distinct.
5 See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTrTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE
OF LOCRNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1998); ERVIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 474-94 (1997). See also discussion infra
Parts 1, I.
6 118 S. Ct. 2132 (1998).
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protection of unenumerated economic rights by invoking the Takings Clause. It
has presumably done so on the assumption that the Takings Clause is a more
restrictive vehicle-and thus a more appropriate one-for unenumerated content,
and so avoids the pitfalls inherent in the Court's earlier use of substantive due
process. 7
This Comment will question the veracity of this assumption by comparing
the logical consequences of Taldngs Clause analysis after Eastern Enterprises
with the substantive due process of the Lochnerg era. It is divided into six Parts.
Part II traces, very briefly, the development of the Court's jurisprudence of
unenumerated economic rights.9 Part IR summarizes the opinion of the plurality
in Eastern Enterprises.10 Part IV addresses the potential interpretational
difficulties created by Eastern Enterprises, demonstrating, ultimately, that the
Taldngs Clause as pictured by the plurality is at least potentially incoherent. 1I Part
V offers proof that, as a logical, legal, and practical matter, the Due Process
Clause is better suited as a vehicle for unenumerated rights.12 Without trying to be
radical, it suggests that Lochner-or, at least, economic substantive due process-
ought to be resurrected if the Takings Clause is the only other interpretational
vehicle that the Court is willing to use. Part VI discusses several possible
solutions to the problems that this comparative analysis reveals. 13 Finally, Part
VII concludes the Comment by reiterating the general proposition that the
doctrine of substantive due process provides a superior vehicle for unenumerated
economic rights when compared to the regulatory takings doctrine, and thus
should form the basis for a new theory of fundamental economic rights.14 The
ultimate goal of this Comment is to demonstrate that the Court's Takings Clause
jurisprudence, if Eastern Enterprises is the new standard, is a far more dangerous
and illogical place for unenumerated rights to reside than the Due Process
Clause.15
7 Of particular importance for the Court in securing this protection was the doctrine of
regulatory takings, discussed inffra Part II.B.
8 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
9 See infra notes 16-50 and accompanying text.10 See infra notes 51-81 and accompanying text.
I1 See infra notes 82-115 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 116-45 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
15 This may be an appropriate time to spell out what this Comment does not purport to do.
Although it is normative, in that it attempts to determine where the course of Supreme Court
jurisprudence should flow in enforcing unenumerated economic rights, it does not attempt to
pass upon whether the enforcement of such rights is a desirable, or even a permissible, judicial
goal. Although the author believes that the experiment of judicially-defined unenumerated
rights has not been a sterling success, defenses and attacks on the concept have been made in
the past-with more skill than can be mustered here-by a variety of legal scholars.
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II. THREADS OF THE PAST
The path led them to a steep set of steps (weeds had begun to push through
the stonework already), and at the top Roland looked back over the [abandoned
gardens]...
"So fell Lord Perth, " murmuredRoland
"'And the countryside did shake with that thunder, " Jake finished.
Roland looked down at him with surprise, like a man awakening from a
deep sleep, then smiled and put an arm around Jake's shoulders. "I have played
Lord Perth in my time, " he said.
"Have you?"
"Yes. Very soon now you shall hear."
- Stephen King1 6
Some scholars have suggested that the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence,
particularly in the area of personal autonomy, is justified. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Securing
Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that democracy is supported by
two "pillars": deliberative democracy, the right to vote as one sees fit, and deliberative
autonomy, the right to make affirmative life choices); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102
HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989) (suggesting that the Court's jurisprudence in finding a right to
privacy in cases like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) is aprotection against totalitarianism).
Other scholars have suggested that any use of substantive due process is impermissible.
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLMCAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAw (1990) (comparing substantive due process to the apple which tempted Adam and Eve in
the Garden of Eden); Robert H. Bork, Federalist Society Symposium Tenth Anniversary
Banquet Speech, 13 J.L. & POL. 513 (1997).
A tiny faction of scholars calls for the abdication ofjudicial review altogether, feeling that
the practice is an open invitation for the minority, i.e. the judiciary, to impose created values on
the will of the majority. See, e.g., John O'Sullivan, Court Disorder, NAT'L REV., Aug. 6, 1990,
at 6 (suggesting that judicial review ought to be abolished, because it places too much power in
the hands of an unelectedjudiciary; this solution would effectively turn all questions concerning
legislation into nonjusticiable political questions).
Finally, some scholars take a middle road, believing that the creation of unenumerated
rights by the judiciary is permissible so long as it enforces only those rights implicit in the
concept of democracy. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (arguing that the judiciary should create rights which insure that the
processes by which laws are made are fair and equal; thus, a right to vote would be permissible,
while a right to abortion would not); Edward B. Foley, The Bicentennial of Calder v. Bull, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1599 (1999) (stating that there are rights implicit in the nature of democracy that
demand to be enforced, whether they are enumerated or not); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian
Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. LJ. 491 (1997) (suggesting that the
judiciary should create rights which insure that individuals and institutions do not become
politically entrenched, subverting the political process).
In any event, the rest of this Comment will assume that the enforcement of economic
rights is a desirable goal, at least within the limits described infra Part IV.




The cyclical nature of its jurisprudence notwithstanding, the Court does not
always explicitly resurrect certain doctrines, either because they are legally or
socially unpopular, or because they would expend the Court's political capital. 17
Economic substantive due process, for the last sixty years, has been the
apotheosis of such doctrines.18 Substantive due process, as every constitutional
law class is taught, is the practice of giving substantive content to both Due
17 Political capital is a concept stemming from the idea that the Court (or any institution of
government) can only "rock the boat" so much; it spends political capital by exercising its will
in ways that flout the wishes of its co-institutions, or which defy the will of the People as a
whole. For a general discussion of the Court's extremely limited political capital in the specific
context of homosexual rights, see Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The
Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 67, 98-99 (1996)
(summarizing the criticism levied at the Court by liberal activists dissatisfied with the Court's
inability to bring about real social change).
18 Some believed that the Court's decision in BMWv. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), would
herald a new age of at least some consideration of economic due process. In Gore, a punitive
damages award issued against BMW for failing to notify the plaintiff that his car had sustained
minor body damage was stricken as being excessive, and thus violative of general due process.
However, Gore seems to have been applied only very narrowly, and has not resulted in a
resurgence of economic substantive due process. This may be a result of the slightly procedural
bent of the issue in Gore; because the jury followed an incorrect formula in calculating the
amount of punitive damages, there is a colorable argument that the result was procedurally, and
not substantively, unjust. See Jim Davis II, Note, BMW v. Gore: Why the States (Not the U.S.
Supreme Court) Should Review Substantive Due Process Challenges to Large Punitive
Damage Awards, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 395 (1998); see also Neil B. Stekloff, Raising Five
Eyebrows: Substantive Due Process Review ofPunitive Damages Awards After BMW v. Gore,
29 CONN. L. REv. 1797 (1997).
It is important to remember that although the Court had, for a time, completely stopped
using the language of due process in engaging the issue of economic rights, it has, within the
last forty years, returned to evaluating economic due process claims using the test it developed
in Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Specifically, it now uses the "rational basis"
test to evaluate such claims. This holds open the possibility that, at some point in the future, the
Court may strike some economic regulation as violative of the Due Process Clause. However,
under the terms of the rational basis test, this law would have to lack any basis in reason; it
would be difficult to find such a law. See Michael J. Phillips, The Nonprivacy Applications of
Substantive Due Process, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 537, 543-49 (1990) (discussing the various tests
used by the Court in substantive due process cases outside the realm of personal autonomy).
Thus, while the Court has never explicitly rejected the idea of unenumerated economic
rights, it has made the process of winning on such a claim virtually impossible. It is important to
note, though, that some Justices, particularly Justice Kennedy, believe that the rational basis test
still provides a means through which a plaintiff can assert a viable substantive due process
claim. He says as much in the principal case, finding that the legislation involved there is not
rationally related to any permissible government objective. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S.
Ct. 2131, 2159 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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Process Clauses19 of the United States Constitution. In other words, the doctrine
gives the Court power to strike down legislation that is substantively, not just
procedurally, abhorrent.20 In truth, the Court has used this power almost
exclusively to enforce rights that are outside the text of the Constitution; it has
used substantive due process to create new rights. Among the rights created, at
one time or another, are the right to own slaves,21 the right to abortion,22 and the
right to live with one's extended family.23
Some unenumerated rights, though, are unlikely to find serious proponents in
our constitutional culture.24 Chief among these are the economic rights first
19 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law... .); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.... ."). Courts
give substantive content to these provisions by reasoning that any law which, in its substance is
unjust, violates due process.
20 John Hart Ely calls the phrase "substantive due process" an oxymoron in his seminal
work Democracy and Distrust. He compares it to the phrase "pastel green redness": a concept
that is, at its deepest levels, nonsensical. Ely argues that, because due process deals with the
processes by which the People are governed, it cannot address itself to the substance of the laws
they pass, unless that substance prevents the political processes from functioning correctly. See
ELY, supra note 15, at 14-21.
21 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that laws which substantively
deprived individuals of property-even slaves-were unconstitutional). Scott, commonly
referred to as the Dred Scott decision, is widely held to have been the Supreme Court's worst
hour, and one of the best reasons for disavowing the doctrine of substantive due process
altogether. It is sometimes seen as one of the precipitating events of the Civil War. Recent
scholarship suggests, though, that the jurisdictional aspects of Dred Scott may have been
ignored in the race to condemn it as a substantive due process decision. See, eg., Christopher L.
Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 CoNsT. COMMENT 37 (1993)
(suggesting that scholarship linking Roe v. Wade and its progeny with Dred Scott is inaccurate
and politically motivated).
22 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (creating an unenumerated right to reproductive
autonomy); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(upholding the result in Roe while modifying the core test used in its application).
23 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (finding an East Cleveland
municipal ordinance that forbade extended families and non-related persons from cohabiting to
be unconstitutional as applied to extended families).
24 No one, for instance, is likely to avoid a conviction for the use or possession of illegal
substances on the grounds that they have a right to personal drug use. Indeed, this is one of the
chief criticisms of the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence-that the Court picks and
chooses what rights it will shield based on divisive social policy. Some scholars have pointed
out that the same arguments which support the right to abortion support rights to such varied,
unpopular, and illegal activities as drug use, incest, and polygamy, none of which are protected.
See Foley, supra note 15, at 1606-13. Indeed, the essential irony of this position has not
escaped the notice of the Court's current members. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 983-84 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Justice Scalia writes:
The right to abort, we are told, inheres in "liberty" because it is among "a person's most
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recognized in Lochner v. New York.25 The "Lochner era" was marked by
increased judicial interference in the decisions made by state legislatures in
regards to economic matters, largely on the grounds that various laws inhibited
the "freedom of contract."26 These cases stood for the proposition that a state
could not inhibit the right of its citizens to make their living in whatever way they
saw fit; in order to restrict this freedom, the states were required to prove that the
legislation was supported by some overridingly important governmental
objective.27
The Lochner era came to an end with Williamson v. Lee Optical28 and
basic decisions".... But it is obvious to anyone applying "reasoned judgment" that the
same adjectives can be applied to many forms of conduct that this Court (including one of
the Justices in today's majority) has held are not entitled to constitutional protection-
because, like abortion, they are forms of conduct that have long been criminalized in
American society. Those adjectives might be applied, for example, to homosexual
sodomy, polygamy, adult incest, and suicide, all of which are equally "intimate" and
"deep[ly] personal" decisions... and all of which can constitutionally be proscribed ....
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
25 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a New York law forbidding bakers to work more than
sixty hours in a week was unconstitutional because it violated the "right to contract").
26 See id at 57 ("It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail-the power
of the State to legislate or the right of the individual to liberty of person and freedom of
contract."); see also Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927) (holding that a
Minnesota law forbidding dairy product buyers from discriminating between localities,
irrespective of their motive, constituted an "interference with freedom of contract" that could be
stricken on due process grounds); Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 267
U.S. 552 (1925) (finding that the liberty of contract is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of
,the Fourteenth Amendment, and may not arbitrarily be interfered with by legislative action);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (holding that a Kansas statute forbidding employers
from using "yellow dog" contracts, which prohibited workers from joining unions, were
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment). For a pre-Lochner rejection of economic
substantive due process, see the Slaugherhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (finding that, inter
alia, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could not be used to shield the
economic rights of displaced butchers in New Orleans).
27 In short, the Court was ruling that government actions which abridged this
unenumerated "right to contract" would be subject to what later came to be called "strict
scrutiny," under which such actions must be directly related to the accomplishment of an
important govemment action. For a further explanation of the concept of strict scrutiny and
other levels of judicial scrutiny, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See
also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 115 (1996) (explaining the concept of the strict
scrutiny, rational basis, and intermediate tests in the context of equal protection). For a more
general discussion of all these tests, see David Crump, How Do Courts Really Discover
Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods ofJudicial Alchemy, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 795 (1996).
28 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Williamson suggests that economic legislation should be
evaluated using only a "rational basis" test; that is, the Court should refrain from striking down
economic legislation so long as it is rationally related to the accomplishment of a permissible
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Ferguson v. lupka,,2 9 two cases which completely disavowed the Court's
previous economic substantive due process cases. For some time, economic rights
were almost disregarded, the laissez-faire economics that drove Lochner and its
progeny disappearing,30 and being replaced by a sense that the States should be
allowed to control their own economic affairs, unhampered by the interference of
the Court.31 Although the Court32 has, at times, shown a willingness to engage
economic rights using the Due Process Clause,33 no economic regulation has
been found unconstitutional34 since the Court decided West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish,35 in 1937.36 A year later, in United States v. Carolene Products,37
Justice Stone articulated in a justly-famous footnote3 8 the principle that was to
become the guiding light of substantive due process jurisprudence for the next
sixty years: the Court would use the Due Process Clause to protect unenumerated
rights of participation in the political process, particularly those of "discrete,
government objective. The question, in other words, is whether the government has a rational
basis for passing the law; if the basis is rational, then the Court will show deference to the will
of the people as embodied by its legislature.
29 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Skrupka held that the Court had "abandon[ed] the use of the
'vague contours' of the Due Process Clause" as a means of evaluating economic legislation, see
id. at 731, and seemed to imply that the rational basis test created by Williamson was even
broader than it appeared at first blush. See id. at 729-30. The Court remarked that the "doctrine
that prevailed in Lochner... has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original
constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
judgment of legislative bodies .... " IdJ at 730.
3 0 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 489-91. Justice Holmes, writing in dissent in
Lochner, wrote that the majority was enacting a theory of economics into law: "This case is
decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain .... The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). His accusation was that, in enforcing a
"freedom of contract," the majority was making the practice of laissez-faire economics a
constitutional imperative for state legislatures. See id.
31 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 489.
32 Although the focus of this Comment is the practice of the Supreme Court itself, others
have detected in lower court decisions the stirrings of economic substantive due process. See
Phillips, supra note 18, at nnA6-58 and accompanying text (discussing the use in state and
lower federal courts of substantive due process tests to invalidate standing legislation). Phillips
believes that while there has been a slow reinvigoration of substantive due process over the past
forty years, "recent decisions using substantive due process as an actual or possible basis for
invalidating social and economic regulation remain a far cry from Lochner... ." Id at 549.
33 See supra note 19.
34 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 491-93.
35 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage laws for women and striking down
"freedom of contract").
36 See CIEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 489.
37 304 U.S. 144 (1938).38 See id. at n.4.
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insular minorities," and those that were "fundamental rights."39 "'In other words,"
as one scholar puts it, "courts generally would presume that laws are
constitutional." 40 Economic rights, after Carolene Products, became the "poor
relations" of rights to personal autonomy.4'
B. A New Home for Economic Rights: The Takings Clause
Economic rights jurisprudence never completely left us though, even in the
days after the Court decided Ferguson v. Skrupka and Carolene Products. The
Court began, before its seeming disavowal of "Lochnerism," to secure economic
rights through other means. 42 The most important of these means was the Takings
Clause.43 It seems a perfect repository for economic rights: it avoids the problems
of Lochner by being a specific, enumerated clause of the Constitution, and it deals
specifically with property. Best of all, it leaves just enough judicial "wiggle-
room" to hold additional content, while apparently retaining specific-enough
content to constrain judges in their task of interpreting the Constitution. The rights
"created" using the Takings Clause have, until this century, been limited in scope
and number, constrained, perhaps, by the very literal language of the Clause
itself44
The Takings Clause was first invoked as a repository of economic rights by
Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.45 Although Mahon has been
viewed in a variety of ways, 46 it is best known for Justice Holmes' majority
39 See id.
4 0 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 490.
41 See Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes, and the New Takings
Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 580 (1990).
42 As Professor Levy has pointed out, the Supreme Court has, over the years, undergone a
cyclical process of reinvigoration and retreat from economic rights. In particular, he notes that
the Court has used such tools as the Contracts Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and various
structural doctrines. See Levy, supra note 4, at 333.
43 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("INor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.').
44 Although many issues have been argued in traditional Takings Clause cases, most such
issues can be condensed into one of two central inquiries. The first, and arguably the more
important, is the question of what constitutes a taking; the second is what, exactly, should earn
the appellation 'just compensation." Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998), may
safely be placed in the list of cases which deals with the former issue.
45 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (finding that a Pennsylvania law forbidding land owners from
mining coal out of land that might subside if excavated constituted a taking under the Fifth
Amendment).
46 Mahon is, in fact, one of the most frenzied points of conflict for scholars and Justices on
both sides of the ideological spectrum. Some see it as the first regulatory takings case; others
insist that it is, at its core, a substantive due process case. See William Michael Treanor, Jam for
Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L. 813, 818-28 (1998)
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opinion, which articulates the modem concept of a regulatory taking 47 The
regulatory takings doctrine was, for a long time, subject to much the same post-
Lochner limitations as economic substantive due process 48
The history of the Takings Clause and the regulatory takings doctrine is well-
known, and so will not be discussed in the body of this Comment at any length. It
should suffice to say that the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence has in
recent years been expanded by the largely conservative Court4 9 These cases
(evaluating various conceptions of what Mahon stands for).
47 Regulatory takings have a storied history, beginning with Mahon and continuing into
the modem era. A "regulatory taking" is so named because it does not involve a physical
seizure of land or other property, but instead occurs when a government regulation renders
property unusable by its owner. In practice, this most often happens with regulations that
prevent an owner of land from performing specific tasks or building certain structures on his
property. Regulatory takings involve an inherent expansion of the word "property" because the
owner of the property is still in legal-and possibly physical-possession of the property. The
government regulation in these cases does not result in a loss of the property, but in a loss of the
usefulness of property. As such, it encourages a view of property as a "bundle of rights"
attached to specific objects or intangible properties. So, for instance, if the government orders,
as it did in Mahon, that owners of property cannot mine the coal out of their ground if it will
cause subsidence, see Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412, they have taken away one of the rights that
comes with ownership of the land.
In Mahon, Justice Holmes wrote that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415. The fundamental question
of Takings analysis since that time has been, "What is 'too far?"' The answer, apparently, is the
three-pronged test articulated by Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., see 475 U.S.
211,224-25 (1986), and used by the Court in Eastern Enterprises, see 118 S. Ct. at 2146. See
infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
For an excellent discussion of the regulatory takings doctrine that reiterates the above
information, and evaluates the history of the Takings Clause as well as all of the cases
mentioned above, in much greater depth, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 510-19. Besides
the ad-hoc test developed in Connolly, the Court has continued to evaluate regulatory takings
based on physical occupation of property and deprivation of all "economically beneficial or
productive use." See Matthew D. Zinn, Note, Ultra Vires Takings, 97 MICH. L. REv. 245, 245
n.3 (1998) (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)); see
also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTTIrlONALLAW §§ 9-5 to 9-6 (1988).
48 Alleged regulatory takings were, in other words, reviewed under a rational basis
standard; if the government had a rational basis for regulating the use of property, the regulation
was not a taking, and the government was not liable for payment
49 See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003 (holding that a government regulation that results in a
one-hundred percent diminution in value is a taking, and leaving open the possibility that a
lesser diminution in value might result in a regulatory taking); Nolan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (establishing a test that requires that a government body in
charge of zoning, when confronted with an allegation that a zoning amounts to a taking, prove
an "essential nexus" between the zoning and a substantial government interest); Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). For a discussion of these cases, see Elizabeth K. Arias, Note,
Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill: Takings Law and Exactions: Where Should North Carolina
Stand?, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 49 (1998).
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indicated a new willingness on the part of the Rehnquist Court to exercise the
regulatory side of the Takings Clause, and elicited a flurry of law review articles
and speculation about the future of economic rights.50
1111. THE PRESENT IN MOTION
Ye blind guides, which strain at a gnat and swallow a camel.
-Matthew 23:24 51
If that were the end of regulatory Takings analysis, the doctrine of economic
rights might well have stabilized; after all, even the very recent cases seem to
follow the spirit of the Takings Clause, if not its letter.52 We are confronted, here,
with Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.53 In many ways, Eastern Enterprises may
represent the pinnacle of the regulatory taldngs doctrine. For reasons that will
shortly become apparent, it extends the ideas articulated in the earlier Takings
cases, and in doing so, may expand the Takings Clause beyond any boundaries
previously envisioned.
A. The Facts of Eastem Enterprises v. Apfel
The facts of Eastern Enterprises are relatively straightforward. During the
1930s, Eastern Enterprises was a coal mining company operating out of West
50 See Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost ofLochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact
on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 605, 667 (1996) (arguing that, while the current
Court's takings jurisprudence gives it the same doctrinal and analytical tools as the Lochner
Court, it has, and will, harness its power in a very limited way); see also Edward 3. Sullivan,
Substantive Due Process Resurrected Through the Takings Clause: Nolan, Dolan, and Ehrlich,
25 ENvfL. L. 155, 156 (decrying Dolan and its companion cases as substantive due process
decisions, and predicting that, in the Court's use of the Takings Clause, "[a] more sophisticated
form of Lochner v. New York is upon us"); see generally Daniel A. Crane, Comment, A Poor
Relation? Regulatory Takings After Dolan v. City of Tigard, U. Ctiu. L. REV. 199 (1996); John
E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CM. L.
REv. 1535 (1994); Brian B. Williams, Note, Dolan v. City of Tigard: A New Era of Takings
Clause Analysis, 74 OR. L. REV. 1105 (1995). Until the Court's most recent term, with its
decision in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998), this speculation was merely
idle, for the Court had not yet returned to its Takings Clause jurisprudence.
51 Jesus uttered these words in condemning the Pharisees, who had, in their struggle to
rigorously follow the letter of Jewish law, abandoned its spirit. The Pharisees, who followed
strict canons of dietary law, strained their water through cheesecloth so as not to ingest any
gnats that might be caught in the liquid. At the same time that they practiced this minor, albeit
stringent, dietary rule, they violated the spirit of the scriptures in their political and private lives.
52 See infra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of the Takings
Clause).
53 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998).
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Virginia and Pennsylvania. 54 The story behind Eastern Enterprises began when
the United Mine Worker's Association (UMWA) demanded that coal operators
begin to provide better health care benefits for their employees; these demands
resulted, eventually, in a nationwide strike in 1946.55
This strike led to the intervention of the federal government in the form of the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (NBCWA) of 1947, establishing a
trust, funded by royalties on coal production 5 6 to provide medical benefits for
coal miners and their families.57 This was followed quickly by the NBCWA of
1950, which established a royalty of thirty cents per ton of coal to be paid into the
fund on a "several and not joint" basis, and distributed by the trustees of the funds
as they saw fit.58 Although subsequent amendments and revisions of the
NBCWA (in 1968 and 1974, most notably) increased the amount of the royalty
payments, they did not substantively alter the structure of the Act. The 1974
version of the Act, though, did guarantee medical coverage to coal miners,
including retirees and their families.59
Following widespread dissatisfaction with this plan,60 the Advisory
Commission on United Mine Workers of America Retiree Health Benefits was
formed to find a way to equitably fund retirement and medical benefits for retirees
from coal mining companies that were no longer a part of the NBCWA.61 The
Commissibn proposed a solution that was eventually adopted as the Coal Act,62
the statute at issue in Eastern Enterprises. It created a centralized trust funded by
premiums paid by signatories of the previous NBCWA agreements. The
Commissioner of Social Security was placed in charge of the Fund, and ordered
to calculate the premiums to be paid by the participants in previous NBCWA
agreements according to a fixed formula.63
54 Seeid at 2142-43.
55 See id. at 2137.
56 This trust was called the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement
Fund. The trustees of the fund, appointed by the parties, would determine what benefits coal
miners and their families would receive under the agreement. See id. at 2138.
57 See id
58 See id Note that this also meant that the benefits were subject to termination at the will
of the trustees.
59 See id. at 2140.
60 See id The Court attributes this to the rising cost of contributing to the Fund. As
individual companies left the Plan because of the availability of cheap non-union labor, the cost
had to be spread across the still-participating companies, causing costs to rise even further.
61 See id.
62 26 U.S.C. § 9706 (1994).
63 This formula, as repeated by the Court, and as it originally appeared in the Act is as
follows:
For purposes of this chapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall ... assign
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The Commissioner (Kenneth Apfel, respondent in Eastern Enterprises)
assigned to Eastern the obligation for premiums respecting over one thousand
retired miners.64 The problem with this assignment was that Eastern had sold its
interest in any coal mining ventures in 1987, long before the enactment of the
Coal Act.65 Eastern would thus, under the Coal Act, be forced to pay vast
amounts of money that it could not have foreseen-over five million dollars for a
twelve-month period, at the time of the Court's decision 66-when it acted as
signatory to the original NBCWA. Eastern sought a declaratory judgment that the
Coal Act, as applied to it retroactively, was unconstitutional. 67
B. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion,68 written by Justice O'Connor, first disposes of largely
irrelevant procedural issues.69 The plurality begins its Takings Clause analysis
with the observation that, although the Eastern Enterprises fact pattern does not
each coal industry retiree who is an eligible beneficiary to a signatory operator which (or
any related person with respect to which) remains in business in the following order.
(1) First, to the signatory operator which-
(A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage agreement or any subsequent coal wage
agreement, and
(B) was the most recent signatory operator to employ the coal industry retiree in the coal
industry for at least 2 years.
(2) Second, if the retiree is not assigned under paragraph (1), to the signatory operator
which-
(A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage agreement or any subsequent coal wage
agreement, and
(B) was the most recent signatory operator to employ the coal industry retiree in the coal
industry.
(3) Third, if the retiree is not assigned under paragraph (1) or (2), to the signatory operator
which employed the coal industry retiree in the coal industry for a longer period of time
than any other signatory operator prior to the effective date of the 1978 coal wage
agreement.
Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2142 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 9706(a)).
64 See id at 2143.
65 See id. Under the terms of the sale, the company that purchased the remainder of
Eastern's already-dwindling coal mining interests assumed "responsibility for payments to...
benefit plans...." Id
66 See id
67 See id at 2144-45.
68 See id at 2137-53.
69 See id at 2144-46. Essentially, ajurisdictional issue arose because the Court of Federal
Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over actions against the Government for damages exceeding
ten thousand dollars that are based on any part of the Constitution; Eastern brought its claim in
federal district court Ultimately, the Court decided that Eastern had properly brought its action
in district court because it sought a declaratory judgment for an injunction, not money damages.
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involve a "[cI]lassic taking[s]" situation, the regulatory takings doctrine is an
appropriate vehicle with which to resolve the constitutionality of the Coal Act.70
The test which will be determinative of whether a regulatory taking has
occurred is drawn by the Court from Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarant.71
Connolly involved a retroactive legislative scheme similar to that challenged in
Eastern, and "left open the possibility that legislation might be unconstitutional if
it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not
have anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is substantially
disproportionate to the parties' experience.' 72 A court considering whether a
governmental action is an unconstitutional taking must consider: (1) how severe
the economic impact of the governmental action will be, (2) whether the act
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character
of the governmental act.73
Application of these factors proves fairly easy for the plurality. It finds, first,
that the economic impact of the Coal Act on Eastern will be a "considerable
financial burden."74 In essence, the plurality writes, Eastern is being forced to pay
an amount that was "[calculated] in a vacuum."75 Under this analysis, the
economic impact of the Commissioner's decision is severe because Eastern's
liability is completely arbitrary: "The correlation between Eastern and [the
circumstances giving rise to] its liability to the... Fund [is too] tenuous .... The
company's obligations under the Act depend solely on its roster of
employees... 50 years before the statute's enactment, without any regard to
responsibilities that... [it] accepted .... ,7 6
Second, the plurality writes that the Coal Act's retroactive effect significantly
interferes with Eastern's reasonable investment-backed expectations by
"attach[ing] new legal consequences to [an employment relationship] completed
before its enactment." 77 In general, the plurality holds that this is so because
retroactivity is heavily disfavored in our law as promoting uncertain and unfair
results. Citing Calder v. Bull78 for the proposition that the Takings Clause forbids
70 See id. at 2146 (citation omitted). The Court characterizes a classic taking as one that
involves "a physical invasion by government" Id. (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
71 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
72 Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2149.
73 See id. at 2146 (citing Kaiser Aetnav. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); see also
Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224-25). The plurality notes, though, that the factors do not comprise a
test that is mechanical in nature; they simply create a lens through which the Court can view the
problem of regulatory takings.
7 4 Id. at 2149.
75 Id. at 2150 (quoting Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 2151 (quoting Landsgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,270 (1994)).
78 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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retroactive legislation relating to property interests,7 9 the plurality concludes its
argument by stating that, on the facts of the case, Eastern could not have foreseen
that it would be liable for lifetime medical benefits for miners who left its employ
more than a quarter of a century ago, particularly when the agreements signed by
Eastem had explicitly left open the question of medical care for mine workers and
retirees.
Finally, the plurality concludes that the "nature of the governmental action in
this case is quite unusual."'8° They find that the Coal Act is unusual because it
picks out an employer and assigns liability based on conduct that occurred in the
distant past, and for purposes with which the employer had no involvement.
Ultimately, the plurality concludes that the nature of the Commissioner's ability
to retroactively assign liability to companies is so unusual that it amounts to an
exercise of eminent domain under the regulatory takings doctrine.81
79 See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2151. The plurality quotes Justice Chase, who wrote
that "[t]he restraint against making any ex postfacto laws was not considered... as extending
to prohibit the depriving a citizen even of a vested right to property, or the provision, 'that
private property should not be taken... without just compensation,' was unnecessary." Id.
(quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 394). Of course, legislation that is retroactive in particular areas (e.g.
tax) is almost never ruled unconstitutional.
80 Id. at 2153.
81 See id. It may be prudent here to note two opinions upon which this Comment will not
touch. In the first of these opinions, Justice Stevens, in a simply-structured dissent, writes that
the critical question-for either a substantive due process or Takings Clause analysis-about
the Coal Act is whether or not the signatories to earlier NBCWA agreements could have
foreseen that they would be forced to pay the current premiums. See id. at 2160-61 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Examining the record, he concludes that the lower courts who passed judgment on
the case were right-as was the Coal Commission-in determining that Eastern and other
signatory companies had an implicit understanding that they would provide lifetime health
benefits for their retirees. See id Given this implicit understanding, Justice Stevens concludes,
the Coal Act does not constitute an unconstitutional taking: "Rather, it seems to me that the
plurality... [has] substituted [its] judgment about what is fair for the better informed judgment
of the Members of the Coal Commission ...." Id. at 2161. Thus, Justice Stevens' position is
that the Coal Act, as applied to Eastern, is constitutional, whichever test is used in the
evaluation. Given this conclusion, it is no surprise that Stevens does not delve any firther into
the question of which test is appropriate.
In the second of these opinions, Justice Thomas also takes a slightly different stance on the
facts presented by Eastern Enterprises. Thomas writes that, although he agrees with the
majority that a taking occurred in the Commissioner's application of the Coal Act to Eastern, he
would use the Eastern Enterprises dilemma as an opportunity to overturn the ages-old decision
in Calder that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution does not apply to civil laws. See id.
at 2154 (Thomas, J., concurring). Although this is ultimately a more grounded solution than the
majority's use of the Takings Clause, it is an unlikely answer to the problem ofretroactivity; the
reversal of Calder would overturn the cornerstone case concerning retroactivity and would
likely throw legislatures across the country into a state of chaos in regards to statutes touching
on civil matters-including, inter alia, taxation and laws affecting private litigation and claims
between parties.
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IV. FuTuRE IMPERFECT
What we've got here... is afailure to communicate.
- CoolHand Luke82
The plurality's holding in Eastern Enterprises is rife with difficulties. There
are conceptual problems that make the decision all but incomprehensible in
application. Ultimately, though, these conceptual problems may be of little
concern; indeed, some commentators have suggested that the holding in Eastern
Enterprises will be confined to its own peculiar facts.83 Whether or not this is so,
it seems clear that lower courts will be required to struggle with the plurality's
reasoning until the Court finds time to address the Takings Clause again. They
will, if the opinion itself is any indication, have some difficulty in doing so. Taken
to its inevitable conclusion, the plurality's logic has the potential to change the
very nature of the Takings Clause as it has always been understood.
The plurality's reasoning is particularly egregious in three ways. First, it
abandons the requirement of a specific property, creating an interpretational
tension with traditional takings doctrine. Second, it shows an essentially flawed
conception of takings when it finds that the government has exercised its power
82 COOL HAND LUKE (Warner Bros. 1967).
83 See Leading Cases, 112 HARv. L. REv. 122, 212-22 (1998) (concentrating on the
changes that the plurality and dissenting opinions inflict on established substantive due process
and takings tests, without evaluating the problems inherent in the plurality's logic, and
concluding that the various Justices are all examining the facts of Eastern Enterprises through
the same 'Jurisprudential lens").
This general feeling that Eastern Enterprises will be construed narrowly may well be the
result of the fact that the case was decided by a plurality. Although Justice Thomas joins with
the core holding of the plurality in his concurring opinion, see Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at
2154 (Thomas, J., concurring), Justice Kennedy balks at the idea of adding any new conceptual
threads into the already-existing Takings Clause jurisprudence. See id. at 2154-60 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). In any event, given the current composition
of the Court and the tentative nature of the plurality, Eastern Enterprises may well be
constrained to its facts.
The plurality opinion's ultimate importance may also be limited by the fact that it deals
with retroactive legislation. Such legislation is, and always has been, distrusted in our law, and
every Justice in Eastern Enterprises makes special note of this fact. The Framers themselves
feared retroactivity to such a great extent that they wove an admonition against it into the very
fabric of the Constitution they had crafted, in the form of the Ex Post Facto Clause. But for an
early twist ofjurisprudential fate in Calder, the Ex Post Facto Clause might well have ended the
need for speculation about which constitutional provision serves to invalidate the Coal Act. In
any event, the Court's very palpable distrust of laws that create substantial retroactive liability
may have played a crucial part in its decision to ivalidate the legislation in Eastern
Enterprises. If some other economic right had been asserted by Eastem, the complexion of the
case might well have been very different.
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of eminent domain by causing private parties to pay one another.84 Finally, the
plurality fails to heed the basic nature of the Takings Clause by using it to strike
down legislation, when the Clause has never been understood to hold such power.
A. The Requirement of a Specific Property
The most problematic part of the plurality's opinion is the way in which it
stretches previous conceptions of the Takings Clause almost to incoherence.
Particularly egregious is its failure to consider exactly what property interest was
at stake in the Commissioner's application of the Coal Act. That is, the
Commissioner determines liability based on a formula that yields a very specific
dollar amount for which signatory entities are liable.85 It is important to note, for
purposes of takings analysis, that the dollar amount that the Commissioner
assigns need not be drawn from a specific property; indeed, the statute does not
authorize the Commissioner to attach corporate property or otherwise designate
the source from which funds are to be drawn.86 Eastern Enterprises would be a
much less problematic case if the Commissioner had been given such power.
In no other case has the Court found a taking like that involved in Eastern
Enterprises.87 The nature of previous regulatory takings suggests that some
specific property interest must be cut off, or at least devalued.88 There is no doubt
84 See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2146.
85 See supra note 63 (reproducing the formula authorized by the Coal Act).
86 Such a provision in the Coal Act would have made the plurality's task even easier, and
might have garnered takings votes from some of the other Justices; after all, the power to seize a
specific property would have more closely resembled the governmental actions which have
traditionally garnered the regulatory taking appellation.
87 Although the Court has confronted legislative schemes very similar to the Coal Act, it
has not, until Eastern Enterprises, invalidated such a scheme by using the regulatory takings
doctrine. The Eastern Enterprises plurality cites Usery v. Tuner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S.
1 (1976) as an example of a case involving a legislative scheme very similar to the one created
by the Coal Act. See Eastern Enters., 118 U.S. at 2146-47.
In Usery, the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 (30 U.S.C. § 901) required mining
companies to pay specified miners for injuries relating to black lung disease, using a formula
similar to that established by the Coal Act. In that case, the Court rejected a due process
challenge, stating simply that they could not, in good faith, say that the legislation acted in an
"arbitrary and irrational way." See Usery, 428 U.S. at 15-17.
In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986), the Court evaluated
the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) (29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-
1461) under both a takings and substantive due process analysis.
88 Indeed, for most of the Constitution's history, the term "taking" referred solely to actual
expropriations of property:
While the term "take" is not defined in the Constitution, it most naturally means an
expropriation of property, such as when the government exercises its eminent domain
power to acquire private property....
1999] 1119
OHIO STATE LA WJOURN'AL
that the Court sometimes uses a great deal of creativity in defining the word
"property" with regard to the government's exercise of eminent domain.8 9 The
very foundation of the regulatory takings doctrine is an expansion of the concept
of property.90 But there are limits to the elasticity of the concept of specific
property interests-stretch the concept too far, and everything becomes property.
The requirement of a specific property serves very important purposes in
analyzing particular government actions as exercises of eminent domain. First
among these purposes, as we shall discuss later,91 is that it mitigates the
conceptual difficulty inherent in fixing just compensation, a price, for what was
taken, when no specific property has been designated. Furthermore, the
government is generally able to levy fines or assess liability for sums of money;
no one has ever suggested that a tax should be considered a taking, for instance.92
In a sense, the plurality's method of framing the Takings Clause is most
troublesome in that it extends the concept of property to the mere presence of
value. That is, when the Takings Clause applies without the condition of
This plain language interpretation of the clause is consistent with both the intent of
the framers of the Constitution and the opinions of the Supreme Court in the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. While there is considerable academic disagreement over the
framer's [sic] general views on property, there is little debate that the fiamers believed that
the Takings Clause only would prohibit actual expropriations of private property. Even
justices like Antonin Scalia, who have applied the clause beyond its text and original
meaning, start from a recognition [of this fact]. Similarly, there is no dispute that until the
second half of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court steadfastly refused to extend the
doctrine ....
Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and
Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 515-16 (1998) (citations
omitted).
89 The Court has been increasingly willing to view property as a "bundle of rights." For
instance, the Court has determined that the ability to use land for a particular purpose,
knowledge of trade secrets, and receipt of welfare are all protectible property interests. See
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that overflights by Government planes,
making it impossible for the owner of certain land to operate a chicken farm there, constituted a
taking); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (holding that trade secrets
are property under the Takings Clause); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (stating that
welfare benefits are property, and thus cannot be terminated without due process of law). See
generally CHEMERiNSKY, supra note 5, at 519-22. For a general discussion of Justice Holmes's
peculiar ability to transform economic disadvantage created by Government regulation into
"property," see Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Otr '1egulatory Takings'
Jurisprudence": The Myth and Meaning ofJustice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996).
90 This statement is true because the regulatory takings doctrine extends the concept of
property beyond common law understandings of the term to encompass the right to use a
specific property. See, e.g., Causby, 328 U.S. at 256; see also supra note 89.
91 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
92 Until now, that is. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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specificity, it may be argued that any government action which results in the
transfer of funds is a taking. Although taxes would certainly be a part of this
equation, they are not the most troublesome area of the law that might be touched
by a conception of the Takings Clause that lies outside the ambit of the specific
property requirement.
Consider the thousands of government-ordered arbitrations and regulatory
hearings that occur every day in the United States, and the millions of lawsuits
decided every year. If the Commissioner's ability to retroactively assess Eastern's
liability under the Coal Act constituted a regulatory taking, why would the
situation be substantively different if a quasi-legislative or even a judicial body
were to assign retroactive liability to a defendant in a civil suit? Conceptually, the
question is a difficult one, for the answer seems to be that it would not.
Indeed, it is difficult to ascertain why the plurality's reasoning could not be
extended to transactions that occur with a great deal more frequency than the
arbitration just mentioned. In a philosophic sense, one of the major functions of
modem government is to assess the liability of citizens for acts they have
committed in the past. Why, then, is there no taking when a judicial body-say, a
Mayor's Court in Groveport, Ohio or the Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas-assesses a fine against a citizen for some past behavior? Nor when an
administrative agency created by legislative fiat-say, the Environmental
Protection Agency-sets and levies the fines for violating regulations that it
created? This latter situation is particularly troublesome under the Eastern
Enterprises plurality's reasoning, for it appears, at least cursorily, to be almost
identical to the Eastern Enterprises fact pattern, except that the fines involved in
the EPA example are paid directly to the government, a fact that militates in favor
of finding a taking.93
This, then, is the logical end result of the plurality's decision in Eastern
Enterprises: it hopelessly muddles the very idea of eminent domain as it is
applied in regulatory contexts. It opens the door to endless charges of takings in
every administrative context, in every area of our daily lives in which the organs
of government are called upon to create new laws that respond to the needs of
citizens. After Eastern Enterprises, it may be difficult for administrative agencies,
not to mention municipal and local governments, to frame legislation that is
takings-resistant, particularly when that legislation has some retroactive effect.
Clearly, in finding that Eastern possessed a right to be free of the retroactive
legislation directed at it by Congress, the Court was required to stretch the
Takings Clause beyond its meaning.94
93 There are, of course, other arguments that explain the seeming immunity of most
judicial decisions of any character from the Takings Clause, but these arguments fall outside the
essential scope of this Comment.
94 This flaw in the plurality's analysis does not escape the notice of the other Justices who
participated in Eastern Enterprises. Justice Kennedy, in his strongly-worded concurrence,
begins his analysis with the observation that the Takings Clause is centered around the concept
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B. A Taking by Private Parties
In addition to the Court's apparent problems in constraining the concept of
property, there are other difficulties that mar the Court's new expansion of the
Takings Clause. In particular, the nature of the agreement codified by the Coal
Act is difficult to frame in terms of eminent domain. The Coal Act takes property
from a specified group of private individuals--in this particular case, the owners
of Eastern-and gives it to the government for distribution to another group of
private individuals, the "orphaned" coal miners and their families.95 Traditionally,
the Takings Clause is applied only to situations in which an organ of the
government takes something for its own use, not when it orders one individual to
pay another.9 6
As an ideal, this makes sense. The classic purpose of the Takings Clause was
to pay citizens for property seized by the government during emergencies97 or for
the institution of public works.98 It is a bulwark designed to insure that selected
property owners are never forced to pay for social enhancements (e.g., roads,
military bases, public utilities) that benefit us all.99 A taking is, in short, one of the
that the government should not be allowed to use someone's property without compensation.
See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2154 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part). For Justice Kennedy, this means that the government must take specific property-the
act of requiring a certain amount of money is simply not enough, even though the "liability
imposed on Eastern no doubt will reduce... its total value." Id at 2156.
Justice Breyer, too, finds fault with the plurality's use of the Takings Clause primarily
because of the type of interest at stake in Eastern Enterprises. He writes, like Justice Kennedy,
that the Takings Clause requires the Government to have seized or at least cut off the use of
some specific property interest. See id. at 2162 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Although he finds no
general fault with the regulatory takings doctrine itself, he notes that every case in which the
doctrine has been invoked has been concerned with "interests in physical property," or
"monetary interest[s] ... [that] ... arose out of the operation of a specific, separately
identifiable fund of money." Id
95 See id at 2142 (plurality opinion).
96 In fact, until the decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), and
the expansion of the regulatory takings doctrine, it was assumed that the Takings Clause applied
only to purely physical appropriations ofproperty. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
97 For instance, some government seizures of property are considered takings even during
times of war. See United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (holding that a
government seizure of coal mines during a strike was a taking, despite the fact that the mines
were occupied by the government during a national strike, during a time of war). But see United
States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (holding that the government's preemptive
destruction of plaintiff's oil rigs to prevent their seizure by the Japanese enemy was not a
taking). For a general discussion of war time seizures and other "exceptions" to the Takings
Clause, see CHEMERvINSKY, supra note 5, at 509-10.
98 As when a state or local government "creates an easement' using its power of eminent
domain over an individual's property in order to build a road, sewage line, or other work of
general public use.
9 9
"[A principal purpose of the Takings Clause is] to bar the Government from forcing
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few situations in which the government explicitly takes on the role of the People,
and purchases property in their name and for their use. This essential purpose
does not jibe with a view of the Takings Clause that touches upon government-
ordered transactions between private individuals. It is difficult, conceptually, to
understand why the Takings Clause would apply to such transactions.100
After all, like the act of assigning liability for past acts, one of the primary
functions of modem government is to mediate disputes between individual
members of society, and between businesses and citizens. Although this function
falls primarily on the judiciary, the work of the legislature and the executive often
entails making value judgments about the competing property interests of
individuals and organizations, particularly in administrative contexts and at local
levels. It calls, in short, for various government officials, on occasion, to order one
citizen to pay another.101 The plurality's vision of the Takings Clause promises to
hopelessly muddle the work of such officials in applying their given
responsibilities, and perhaps even to throw into confusion the work of the
judiciary.' 0 2 As Justice Breyer writes in Eastern Enterprises: "[There is no taking
where] the Government does not physically invade or permanently appropriate
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
100 Note that this is not a textual requirement-the actual language of the Takings Clause
does not make any distinction between a taking by the government for the benefit of a private
individual and a taking by the government for its own use. But to read the Takings Clause as
relevant to government-ordered transactions is to ignore the basic policies that underlie it, and to
abandon the case law which has interpreted the Clause for two hundred years. The fact that the
specific text ofthe Takings Clause can be read to include such transactions should hold no more
weight than the fact that it does not preclude judicial decisions from being the subject of takings
charges; it has, of course, rarely been understood to include either.
101 Or as the plurality in Eastern Enteprises itself writes: "In the course of regulating
commerical and other human affairs ... Congress routinely creates burdens for some that
directly benefit others." Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2132, 2147-48 (1998) (quoting
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211,223 (1986)).
102 For instance, there may be a colorable takings claim under this logic when a court
finds that an individual must grant an easement to his neighbor. After all, the claimant can argue
that the government has effectively given his property to another without compensating him for
it.
Of course, a court is likely to argue in such a situation that it has simply determined who
owned the property all along, under relevant statutes and case law. It is likely, in short, to
conclude that the decision in such a case is not a manifestation of positive law-that the court
did not create the property right that now resides in the easement holder-but is instead a
"discovery" or determination of a pre-lawsuit condition of property ownership.
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any... assets for its own use."103 The result in Eastern Enterprises cannot be
good.104
C. The Lost Meaning ofJust Compensation After Eastern Enterprises
Finally, the decision in Eastern Enterprises hopelessly muddles fundamental
understandings about the way in which the Takings Clause is meant to operate.
Traditionally,105 and on its face,106 the Takings Clause does not seem to deny the
103 Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2162 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(citing Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225). Interestingly enough, it is from Connolly that the plurality
draws the takings test with which it invalidates the Coal Act. See id. at 2147-49; see also supra
notes 71-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's application of Connolly to the
Eastern Enterprises fact pattern).
104 Nor does the apparently unique nature of the taking in Eastern Enterprises escape the
notice of Justice Breyer; this particular flaw in logic prompts him to write that the plurality's
Takings Clause analysis "bristles with conceptual difficulties[:] If the [Takings] Clause applies
when the government simply orders A to pay B," he writes, "why does it not apply when the
government orders A to pay the govemment... ?" Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2162 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). In other words, Justice Breyer believes that the nature of the transaction covered
by the Takings Clause in Eastern Enterprises, coupled with the lack of a specific property
interest at stake, combines to create an interpretational scheme in which both a tax levied by the
government and a government-ordered transaction between two individuals is no different,
substantively, from a physical invasion of property. Strikingly, the plurality never answers this
charge.
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, indicates that the nature of the transaction does not
particularly affect his judgment one way or another:.
The circumstance that the statute does not take money for the Government but
instead makes it payable to third persons is not a factor I rely upon to show the lack of a
taking. [Although] there are instances where the Government's self-enrichment may make
it all the more evident a taking has occurred.
Id. at 2156 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
105 Justice Kennedy, for instance, in his concurring opinion, cites First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), for
the proposition that the Takings Clause does not prohibit acts which are otherwise
constitutional. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2157 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part). The First Evangelical Court said:
[The Takings Clause] does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a
condition on the exercise of that power. This basic understanding of the Amendment
makes clear that it is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property
rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper
interference amounting to a taking.
First Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 314-15 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
106The Clause states that the government shall take no property "without just
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government the ability to do any act. It simply says that Congress cannot perform
specific acts (takings) without "just compensation."' 07 Yet the plurality in
Eastern Enterprises completely disallows the Commissioner's application of the
Coal Act to Eastern. Clearly, this is not, on the plain face of the Constitution, a
proper result. Justice Kennedy says as much in his concurrence in Eastern
Enterprises when he writes that the Takings Clause simply "operates as a
conditional limitation, permitting the Government to do what it wants so long as it
pays the charge."'1 8 The Takings Clause is thus a conditional device, not a
prohibitory one.
The plurality's confusion of this issue may result from its failure to identify a
specific property interest which is the subject of a "taking."'109 Logically, the
government cannot compensate an individual or a company for actions that
amount to a seizure of cash. The only payments which the government has ever
used as just compensation for a taking are like-kind, but only very rarely, and
cash, the method most often used.110 Presumably, under traditional concepts of
eminent domain, the government must give over the fair value of what it took.
The fair value of a specific sum of money is, obviously, the amount of money
taken; the concept of a taking or of just compensation in this situation is simply
impracticable." '
Consider how the Eastern Enterprises fact pattern would be analyzed using a
traditional Takings Clause analysis: the Commissioner of Social Security would
be free to continue the action that violates the Clause-in this case, the
assessment of liability against Eastern-so long as his office (or some part of the
government) gives Eastern its just compensation for the action. The value of the
compensation," implying that takings are still valid governmental actions, so long as the "takee"
is justly compensated for his property. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
107 Seeid.
108 Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2157 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
109 See discussion supra Part IVA and accompanying notes.
"10 See 16 U.S.C. § 20e (1994) for one definition ofjust compensation. It reads, in part:
Unless otherwise provided by agreement of the parties, just compensation shall be an
amount equal to the sound value of such structure, fixture, or improvement at the time of
taking by the United States determined upon the basis of reconstruction cost less
depreciation evidenced by its condition and prospective serviceability in comparison with
a new unit of like kind, but not to exceed fair market value.
Id.
" IThe plurality writes that the Eastern Enterprises fact pattern represents a situation in
which "monetary relief against the Government is [not] an available remedy." Eastern Enters.,
118 S. Ct. at 2145. This statement, in retrospect, could not be more correct. Ironically, the Court
admits that monetary compensation-the only relief appropriately available under the Takings
Clause-is unavailable, but fails to take the additional step that an honest assessment of the
facts requires: that these facts are poorly fitted to a takings analysis.
1999] 1125
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
contribution that must be returned is, of course, the exact amount paid into the
fund. This is an incoherent result and reveals, at its core, the way in which the
plurality's opinion is at war with the substance of the Takings Clause. Clearly,
even if the Court had not specifically written that its decision acted to strike down
the Coal Act,1 12 the practical effect of the situation described above is to make
application of the Coal Act to Eastern-or to anyone similarly situated-fruitless.
Envisioned this way, the result reached by the plurality is at its core incoherent
the Takings Clause simply does not empower the Court to strike down any
legislation.
In addition, the plurality's conception of the Takings Clause as applying to
government-ordered transactions between individuals 13 may lead to its use as an
instrument with which to strike down legislation. After all, how does one frame
what the idea of "just compensation" might mean when the government orders
one individual to pay another for some past obligation-whether the obligation
was truly incurred or not? Even if one does not consider such ideas as the time-
value of money and the practical difficulties in ascertaining the value of an
obligation incurred in the past, the operative question of how much the
government owes for enforcing its justice is a seemingly impossible one. The
line-drawing problems presented by such a scenario are staggering.
In combination, the Court's fundamental misunderstanding of the property
interests that must be at stake to facilitate a taking and the nature of its power to
enforce the Takings Clause act to undermine the fundamental coherence of its
economic rights jurisprudence. When the Court is forced to extend the Takings
Clause to the boundaries of common sense, as it does in Eastern Enterprises, it is
clear that it is doing so because the concept of eminent domain cannot contain the
weight of unenumerated economic rights, even a right as uncontroversial as the
right to remain unaffected by retroactive legislation.114 The regulatory takings
doctrine, no matter how useful it may have been in the past as a means of
sketching out the contours of economic rights jurisprudence, 115 has been
stretched to the snapping point, if the plurality's opinion in Eastern Enterprises is
any indication of things to come.
112 See id. at 2153. The plurality writes:
In enacting the Coal Act, Congress was responding to a serious problem with the
funding of health benefits for retired coal miners. While we do not question Congress'
power to address that problem, the solution it crafted improperly places a severe,
disproportionate, and extremely retroactive burden on Eastern. Accordingly, we conclude
that the Coal Act's allocation of liability to Eastern violates the Takings Clause, and that
26 U.S.C. § 9706(a)(3) should be enjoined as applied to Eastern.
Id.
113 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
1 14 See supra note 83.




So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the
past....
- F. Scott Fitzgerald1 16
The wheel of time has come full circle; the high Court feels some compulsion
to protect the unenumerated economic rights of citizens, and it has chosen a
primary vehicle, the regulatory takings doctrine, which is clearly at war with
common sense. It seeks to weave a pattern similar to that achieved by Lochner-
era jurisprudence with the thread of a clearly unsuitable doctrine. The question,
then, is whether any other doctrine of constitutional interpretation, or any other
provision of the Constitution, can provide us with a more logically consistent
place from which to derive unenumerated economic rights.
For the reasons that follow, the doctrine of substantive due process, although
much-maligned by post-1937 Courts and scholars-with some exceptions1 17 -is
a superior alternative to the regulatory takings doctrine in this regard. Although
the advantages accorded by substantive due process are many, there are, in
particular, three reasons that the Due Process Clause is a superior vehicle for
unenumerated rights. First, the regulatory takings doctrine and the substantive due
process doctrine are so intertwined that they are nearly indistinguishable;
regulatory takings are, in fact, little more than substantive due process "dressed
up" as something a little more palatable. Second, the use of the substantive due
process doctrine will provide a balance to the Court's jurisprudence of
unenumerated fiundamental rights that cannot be achieved with the current
regulatory takings doctrine, even before the potentially unbalancing effects of the
decision in Eastern Enterprises. Finally, the use of substantive due process to
protect unenumerated rights promises, frighteningly enough, to provide a
consistency, a certainty, that the regulatory takings doctrine cannot.
116 F. Scorr FITZGERALD, ThE GREAT GATSBY 189 (Collier, 1992) (1925).
117 As mentioned before, the Court has recently shown a very limited willingness to
engage some economic rights by using substantive due process. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's recent decision in BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996)). In addition, at least one commentator has suggested that the Lochner era did not result
in nearly the amount ofjudicial activism with which it is credited. See Michael J. Phillips, How
Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process Effective?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1049
(1997) (performing a numerical study of the case law, concluding that the number of statutes
invalidated on economic substantive due process grounds is really relatively small and
rejecting, inter alia, the contention that the Lochner Court's primary motive in establishing
economic substantive due process was to advance the interests of businesses).
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A. Takings Clause Jurisprudence is Substantive Due Process
Jurisprudence; Substantive Due Process is the Source of the Modern
Takings Doctrine
The first reason that the Due Process Clause should be used to protect
unenumerated rights instead of the Takings Clause is a simple one: scholars and
the Court itself have long recognized that the Court's regulatory takings doctrine
is inextricably intertwined with its substantive due process jurisprudence.1 18
On the most elemental of levels, the takings doctrine as applied against the
states is the creation of an unenumerated right, through the application of the Fifth
Amendment to the states, a process quite similar to the incorporation of other
parts of the Bill of Rights to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment
as written does not apply to the states; it merely guarantees that the federal
government will not abridge the rights of citizens. The Takings Clause has been
applied quite vigorously to actions taken by the states, although not always
precisely in the name of substantive due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.119 Although Federal, and not state, action was implicated in Eastern
Enterprises, the vast majority of regulatory takings-indeed, the vast majority of
"classic" takings-involve actions by state governments.
The argument to be made here is not a subtle one. The use of the Takings
Clause in most cases requires that the Court use a doctrine of unenumerated
rights, similar in nature to the doctrine of incorporation, to apply the
Constitution's prohibition of eminent domain without just compensation to
offending legislation, because most offending legislation is created by state fiat
As such, it seems backward, if not downright hypocritical, for the Court to
pretend that it is avoiding substantive due process by applying the Takings Clause
in regulatory contexts. Due process is, thus, a more honest road to the
enforcement of unenumerated economic rights than the Takings Clause.
Admittedly, this argument is limited in its scope. The Court's use of the
115 The Eastern Enterprises plurality admits as much when it says that "[o]ur analysis of
legislation under Taldngs and Due Process is correlated to some extent." See Eastern Enters. v.
Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2153 (1998).
119 Although it does not seem to have been explicitly incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment using substantive due process, there are many cases applying the Takings Clause
to state actions. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 119 S. Ct 1624
(1999) (considering a claim that a city's failure to authorize various proposals to develop local
land amounted to a taking under the Federal Constitution); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (striking down aNew York cable television
regulation under the federal Constitution); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (considering
a Takings challenge to Kansas liquor law).
None of these decisions indicates explicitly that the Takings Clause has been incorporated
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The effect of these decisions, though,
and of the Court's consistent use of the Takings Clause to evaluate state statutes and
regulations, is much the same.
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substantive due process doctrine to extend the enumerated rights of the first ten
amendments to legislation passed by the states is a different, and potentially less
extensive, endeavor than the "discovery" of unenumerated rights. But the
principle remains: the Court's takings jurisprudence has its roots in substantive
due process. As such, it would undoubtedly be better for the Court to utilize the
substantive due process doctrine to sketch out the contours of its economic rights
jurisprudence than to retain the Takings Clause as a kind of smoke screen for the
clandestine enforcement of unenumerated rights.
Although the Court attempts in nearly every case involving economic rights
to invoke the decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon120 as precedentll
there is wide division over what Mahon really means. Recent scholarship seems
to indicate that Mahon may stand for something very different than the cause for
which it is traditionally invoked. 122 Progressives in the era following Justice
Holmes's departure from the Court were deeply skeptical about Mahon,
considering it an aberration in the career of a man who otherwise functioned as
the apotheosis of progressive conceptions of property ownership.123 In fact,
Mahon is often viewed as, at its core, a substantive due process decision.
In fact, many of the regulatory takings cases of the modem era are viewed as
containing some element of substantive due process. 124 In particular, Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,125 the case from which the Eastern Enterprises
plurality draws its essential takings test, is deeply endowed with due process
concerns. Similarly, Justice Stevens implies in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council that these two areas of the law are closely intertwined. 126 This Comment
would point out that the two are not just intertwined; they are nearly identical.
120 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
121 The plurality in Eastern Enterprises invokes Mahon more than once as the root source
of its Takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2146.
12 2 See James Audley McLaughlin, Majoritarian Theft in the Regulatory State: What's a
Takings Clause For?, 19 WM. & MARY ENVTh. L. & POL'Y REV. 161 (1995); see also Richard
A. Epstein, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon: The Erratic Takings Jurisprudence of Justice
Holmes, 86 GEo. L.L 875 (1998) (asking whether current Supreme Court Takings
jurisprudence is justified by Mahon); Treanor, supra note 46, at 820-33.
123 These conceptions were not entirely valid. Although Justice Holmes authored a
prophetic dissent in Lochner, in which he railed against the majority for striking down the
legislation in that case, it is clear, even in Lochner, that he agreed with the principle behind that
decision: that the Court could enforce extra-textual rights where appropriate. Judge Bork, for
one, has pointed out that Justice Holmes joined the majority in a variety of economic
substantive due process decisions during his tenure on the Court. See BORK, supra note 15, at
47.
124 Again, this is no surprise. The plurality admits as much when it states that the areas of
substantive due process and regulatory takings are "correlated to some extent." See Eastern
Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2153.
125 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
126 See 505 U.S. 1003, 1072 n.7 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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This is perhaps indicated most strongly by the nature of the differing opinions
in Eastern Enterprises. The plurality, the concurrence, and the dissent are
remarkably close together on the issue of which test to use;127 they are simply in
disagreement about the doctrine under which this test should fall.
Finally, an argument posited by Justice Kennedy, almost sode voce, may
illustrate why substantive due process is a superior vehicle when compared to the
regulatory takings doctrine. He contends that although the majority appears to feel
that its use of the Takings Clause does not require a normative judgment about the
wisdom of the Coal Act, all actions which declare something unconstitutional
involve normative judgments of one sort or another.128
There is some wisdom in his statement. The regulatory takings doctrine's
essential test, as articulated in Connolly, seems to invite Justices to apply their
own standards of economic fairness to the legislation in question. The test can be
applied in ways that are essentially subjective and lack the guidance of even so
loose a standard as the rational basis test used to evaluate due process claims.
B. Balance
Although the Court very recently indicated that it might seek to abandon the
doctrine of substantive due process altogether, even in cases involving purely
personal autonomy,129 it has shown no willingness to truly do so. 130 The
implications of a complete reversal of all substantive due process seem
staggering. 131
127 In fact, the most radically different solution may be that proposed by Justice Thomas,
see supra note 81.
128 See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2157 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy writes:
If the plurality is adopting its novel and expansive concept of a taking in order to
avoid making a normative judgment about the Coal Act, it fails in the attempt for it must
make the normative judgment in all events .... This sort of analysis is in uneasy tension
with our basic understanding of the Takings Clause ....
Id. (citations omitted).
129 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that terminally-ill
individuals have no right to a physician-assisted suicide, while leaving open the possibility that
there may be a right to allow oneself to die); see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
130 At least, there has been no serious challenge to such long-standing substantive due
process cases as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
131 The Court has, in fact, created so many '"new rights" over the last thirty years, in cases
like Roe, Griswold, and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), that there is no
telling what political and social upheavals might follow a reversal of all substantive due process
"rights." They would likely make the uncertainty which followed the Court's disavowal of
economic substantive due process in Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), look
1130 [Vol. 60:3
HOWLOCHNER GOTITRIGHT
But this presents a conundrum: although the Court seems willing and able to
give substantive content to the word "liberty" in the Due Process Clause, it has
been surprisingly stingy in imputing any meaning to the word "property." Clearly,
the Lochner era, and the illegitimacy imputed to that phase of the Court's history,
both within the academy 132 and by the Court itself,133 have made the Court gun-
shy in enforcing unenumerated economic rights through the Due Process Clause.
Yet some decisions from the Lochner era have never been abandoned. There
are, in particular, several cases which address what we would call rights to
personal autonomy that have remained good law, and have even been cited with
approval by the Court in subsequent substantive due process decisions.134 This,
too, presents a fundamental question about the Court's rights jurisprudence: why
are rights to personal autonomy 135 apparently more important than economic
rights? Why are economic rights the "poor relations" of individual freedoms? 136
There is no good reason. Behind the prejudice of the Court lies no sound
policy-except, perhaps, for a desire to avoid charges of Lochnering--or
coherent plan of action for the enforcement of individual rights. It cannot be that
rights to personal autonomy are more important than economic rights, although
some may argue that it is so. 137 The intent of the Framers will not avail us here,
either. The word "liberty" carries no more weight than the word "property" in the
Due Process Clauses; there is no textual clue or other note, no evidence that the
Framers intended that these rights should receive more protection than others.
If the Court continues to use the Due Process Clause to enforce
unenumerated rights of personal autonomy-and it has, despite statements to the
tame by comparison.
132 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 493-94; see also Michael J. Phillips, The
Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENV. L. REV. 453, 455-61 (1998) (describing the
criticism levied at the Lochner Court).
133 All sides of Eastern Enterprises, for instance, take great pains to point out that they are
not Lochnering. The plurality is somewhat subtle: "mhis Court has expressed concerns about
using the Due Process Clause to invalidate economic legislation." Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at
2153. Justice Kennedy is more explicit: "[T]he plurality is adopting its novel and expansive
concept of a taking in order to avoid making a normative judgment about the Coal Act .... " Id
at 2157 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Finally, Justice Breyer
names the problem: "Insofar as the plurality avoids reliance upon the Due Process Clause for
fear of resurrecting Lochner v. New York and related doctrines of 'substantive due process,' that
fear is misplaced." Id. at 2163 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
134 See supra note 130.
135 Some examples include the right to privacy, the right to reproductive autonomy, and
the right to live with one's extended family. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 50.
137 Justice Stone's famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144




contrary, shown no sign of really doing so138-then it is stunningly dishonest for
the Court to avoid the issue139 by enforcing economic rights through a doctrine
that is clearly unsuitable for doing so.1 40 The Court's fundamental rights
jurisprudence is fatally unbalanced by its refusal to enforce unenumerated
economic rights through the substantive due process doctrine. It should begin to
craft a substantive due process jurisprudence that will enforce economic rights,
under whatever test it deems appropriate. 41
C. Certainty
Finally, the most surprising reason that the substantive due process doctrine
may be a superior vehicle for the enumeration of unenumerated rights in our
constitutional order is that it provides a measure of certainty that the regulatory
takings doctrine cannot. This claim is surprising mostly because the foremost
complaint against Lochner and its progeny is that they make it difficult for
legislatures to know what economic regulations would withstand due process
challenges; the substantive due process tests of that era, the creed goes, were
arcane formulations that amounted to little more than the Justices' own subjective
viewpoints on the legislation in question.142
Although the truth of this charge, in retrospect, is not at all clear,143 it says
nothing about the viability of today's substantive due process doctrine. Assuming
that judicial restraint is a virtue to be cherished, it is important to note that, of the
five Justices who wrote in Eastern Enterprises that they would invoke substantive
138 See supra notes 129-30.
139 Some would contend that conservative members of the current Court are being
dishonest in attempting to enforce any constitutional clause beyond the boundaries of its text.
Justice Scalia, always a strict textualist in just about any given situation, seems to cut a slightly
wider interpretational swath through opinions that deal specifically with economic interests than
he does with cases that involve rights to personal autonomy. His dissent in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting), is among the most vociferous denials of
fundamental rights jurisprudence in the entire body of Supreme Court cases, and his concern is
mostly textual in nature-he argues that the Court acts illegitimately when it seeks to read into
the Constitution content that the text does explicitly support. Tellingly, though, in Eastern
Enterprises, Justice Scaliajoins the plurality opinion in stretching the boundaries of the Takings
Clause. See 118 S. Ct. at 2131.
140 See discussion supra Part IV.
141 As Justice Kennedy's concurrence reveals, even the current, weakened version of
substantive due process strikes down some economic legislation that is not rationally related to
a legitimate government purpose. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2157 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
142 See Phillips, supra note 132, at 459-60.
143 See Phillips, supra note 117, at 1089-90 (suggesting that the Lochner-era Court
rejected over 95 percent of the due process claims brought before it).
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due process to evaluate economic regulation, 144 only one, Justice Kennedy,
contended that it should invalidate the Coal Act. It is of note, too, that no
regulation has been struck down on economic substantive due process grounds in
almost seventy years.
The visceral hatred of Lochner and the knee-jerk reaction against economic
substantive due process that it has inspired may well be the product of sixty years
of hatred within the academy, as well as within the courts. As two of the opinions
in the principal case point out, the shadow of Lochner lies long on the Court's
economic rights jurisprudence. 145
This gut-level aversion to Lochnerism is one of the chief reasons that the
substantive due process doctrine might provide the area of economic rights with
the restraint that will be required. The Court no longer does anything lightly in the
name of substantive due process, if it ever did. It is unlikely to show more
restraint with the regulatory takings doctrine-particularly if the plurality in
Eastern Enterprises gains a vote-than it can with a doctrine it knows it must
wield carefully.
VI. A WAY TO TuRN THE WHEEL?
On the fourth day, to her great joy, Oz sent for her, and when she entered
the Throne Room, he greeted her pleasantly.
'Sit down, my dear. I think Ihavefound a way to get out of this country.'
'And back to Kansas?'she asked eagerly.
'Well, I'm not sure about Kansas, 'said Oz, for I haven't the faintest notion
of which way it lies .... '
- L. Frank Baum 146
As these factors indicate, the regulatory takings doctrine falls far short of
substantive due process as a vehicle for enforcing unenumerated economic rights.
But proving that it is so is a hollow victory; the problem is knowing what to do
vith this victory after it has been achieved. The thought that the current Court
might be destroying the integrity of one part of the Constitution in order to avoid
charges of Lochnering is a sobering one. And the thought that the use of
substantive due process a la Lochner might be a superior doctrine of
constitutional interpretation is an absolutely frightening one.
This conundrum begs the question: how is the judiciary to protect citizens
(and their corporations) from substantive economic injustice? Clearly, there is a
need, both socially and politically, to protect such rights, or the legal and
144 Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Ginsberg, Breyer, and Souter.
145 The plurality opinion and Justice Breyer's opinion both make clear that the ghost of
Lochner is one of the forces preventing the use of substantive due process. See supra note 133.
14 6 L. FRANK BAUM, THE WIZARD OF OZ (Tor, 1993). Like the Wizard, I know how to get
out of the place we're in, but I don't know in which way the correct solution lies.
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constitutional literature would not be filled with essays purporting to contain
canons of constitutional interpretation that allow them.147
But the Court's current understanding of the Due Process Clause is clearly
unsatisfactory and unreliable. Justice Breyer articulates this understanding in
Eastern Enterprises, when he writes for the dissenters that "there is no need to
torture the Takings Clause to fit this case." 148 The "natural home" of Eastem's
claim is, instead, the Due Process Clause, because the Coal Act, if it was invalid,
was so because its retroactivity is "fundamentally unfair. ' 149
This articulation of substantive due process is almost laughably unclear. Even
as Justice Breyer asserts that he does not espouse a return to the substantive due
process of the Lochner era, 150 he fails to describe the contours of a coherent
standard by which it can be measured. I can almost hear a chorus of voices asking
how Breyer's fundamental unfairness test differs from the subjective opinions of
the individual Justices, or from the wide-ranging standard of the Lochner era.
And, of course, all of those voices are right. Such a loose standard invites a
return to Lochner. Clearly, even if a return to the days of Lochner were possible,
it would not be normatively desirable. The Lochner era was marked by more than
a thirst on the part of the judiciary to protect unenumerated rights; its hallmark
was an interpretational framework that depended on the discretion of individual
Justices with specific economic views.
What is needed is a theory that will properly constrain the Court in its use of
the Due Process Clause, the only provision of the Constitution which will
properly hold the weight of unenumerated rights.151 The search for such a theory
147 See supra note 15.
148 Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2163 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 2163-64. The test articulated by Justice Breyer to determine whether a law is
fundamentally unfair in its application is essentially the same as that used by Justice Stevens.
The question is this: is it fundamentally unfair to make Eastern pay for its past association with
now-retired coal miners? In other words, as Breyer tersely states: "[W]hy Eastern?" Id. at 2164.
Breyer explains, briefly, that the "fundamental fairness" test asks whether "the historical
circumstances, taken together, prevent Eastern from showing that the Act's 'reachback' liability
provision so frustrates Eastem's reasonable settled expectations as to impose an
unconstitutional liability." Id. Justice Breyer then examines the historical circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the NBCWA and concludes that, taken together, they indicate that
Eastern could have expected, reasonably, that it would be required to provide lifetime medical
benefits to the "orphaned" retirees in question, regardless of the explicit terms of the agreement
that it signed. See id. at 2164-68.
Breyer attempts to head off criticism by writing that his use of the Due Process Clause to
forbid retroactive application of the Coal Act is not designed to "resurrect.. .'freedom of
contract,"' but to "read the [Due Process] Clause in the light of [its] basic purpose." Id. at 2164.
This purpose, presumably, is to provide a fundamentally fair result.
150 See id at 2163-64.
151 Other theories have been suggested, but usually confine themselves to methods that
the judiciary could use to derive unenumerated rights of personal autonomy or democratic
participation. See supra note 15.
1134 [Vol. 60:3
HOWLOCHNER GOTITRIGHT
would consume whole tomes of academic criticism and is thus outside the
essential scope of this Comment. But it is important, nonetheless. There is a
deficiency in our Supreme Court's jurisprudence that must be addressed before
unenumerated economic rights can be protected, without fatally fracturing some
portion of the Constitution by according too great a degree of power to the
judiciary.
Some scholars have suggested that the Court should evaluate economic rights
under much the same rubric as the fundamental rights that are currently the
exclusive subject of substantive due process.152 Recent scholarship also suggests
that the Lochner Court may not have wielded its power in so broad a manner as
its accusers would have us believe.153
Others have suggested that the Equal Protection Clause should be used in
conjunction with the Due Process Clause to secure economic liberties.154 These
scholars find an answer in the political process theories of scholars like John H.
Ely and Michael Klarman.155 They suggest specifically, that the process-
perfecting rights that underlie the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Constitution can provide a coherent answer to the question of which methods
can best constrain the Court in the task of enumerating unenumerated rights' 56 by
insuring that the processes through which economic regulations are created and
enforced are democratically enacted.
The final conclusion to which this enumeration of conflicting theories may
bring us is the not-unreasonable idea that the Court should retreat from the
enforcement of unenumerated economic rights altogether. Skeptical theorists 157
would undoubtedly take the opportunity provided by the plurality's tortured logic
152 See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L. 555
(1997) (arguing that the Court's current perception of its fundamental rights jurisprudence
should be extended to cover various property interests).
15 3 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 117; Phillips, supra note 132.
154 See Levy, supra note 4, at 414-29.
155 See supra note 15.
156 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 4, at 415. In addition, Levy suggests that "[t]o avoid the
excesses of Lochner... the Court must also reject the categorical elements of current
fundamental rights doctrine and engage in a more forthright evaluation of the relevant
considerations underlying constitutional protection for both kinds of rights." Id (emphasis
added). Note that Levy appeals to the idea of balance, discussed supra Part IV.B.
Levy argues that the current method of applying fundamental rights jurisprudence should
be abandoned and replaced with a "more nuanced analysis of all constitutionally protected
interests." Id. at 418. He proposes a test that focuses on two factors: "(1) the extent to which
government action burdens fundamental economic or other constitutionally protected interests;
and (2) the extent to which particular actions are the result of political-process failures." Id at
418-19.
157 See supra note 15. Conservative theorists like Bork, Monaghan, and Waldron are often
typified as "constitutional skeptics" because they are skeptical of the existence of extra-
constitutional fundamental rights of any kind. See Foley, supra note 15, at 1600.
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in Eastern Enterprises to point out that the doctrine of substantive due process
was one of the most disastrous interpretational detours in the Court's history.158
These skeptics might say that if the best that the Court can do to enforce
unenumerated rights is to invoke a doctrine that clearly has less to do with
unenumerated rights than the Due Process Clause, it may well have indicated the
essential truth that our Constitution cannot hold unenumerated rights at all.159
Perhaps, as the skeptics would contend, the ultimate meaning of Eastern
Enterprises is that the Court should stop enforcing unenumerated rights
altogether, for it either cannot or will not find a means to "discover" them that can
be constrained by the Constitution as written.
VII. CONCLUSION
There are neither beginnings nor endings to the turning of the Wheel of
Time. But it was a beginning.
- Robert Jordan 160
Whatever solution is chosen, Eastern Enterprises imbues the decision with a
sense of urgency. Eastern Enterprises indicates, if it is not held to its facts, that
the Court lacks a compass in wielding the doctrine of regulatory takings. We have
reached a point in our constitutional jurisprudence when economic rights are
again becoming important. The wheel of time has spun 'round again, in a
conjunction of social, political, economic, and philosophic currents that
apparently require the Court to invoke some part of the Constitution as a means of
striking down legislation that is fundamentally unfair in economic terms.
The Court's logic in Eastern Enterprises proves conclusively that the
Takings Clause is not the most appropriate part of the Constitution to hold these
rights. The Due Process Clause is a far more suitable vehicle, both practically and
conceptually, with which to protect individuals from unfair economic legislation.
The wheel has turned, and the course of our Supreme Court's jurisprudence
should be allowed to turn with it.
The cyclical nature of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is ultimately a trend
to be embraced, not abhorred. It reflects the absolute truth that a society, over
time, will have differing needs that must be addressed by its constitution. 161 Our
158 See BORK, supra note 15, at 44-46 ('To this day, when a judge simply makes up the
Constitution he is said 'to Lochnerize,' usually by someone who does not like the result...
Both federal and state courts [of that period] wereproducing lots of Lochners.').
159 See supra note 15.
1 6 0 ROBERT JORDAN, THE PATH OF DAGGERS 45 (Tor, 1998).
161 The history of other cultures seems to carry out the theory that a constitution whose
contours are too rigid cannot survive for long. The Romans, for instance, had an unwritten
constitution whose contours were spelled out by two forms of public law: the ius civile and the
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own Constitution is notoriously difficult to amend;162 the Court's recognition of
changing circumstance may thus simply be a "safety valve" that allows social
pressure to escape without destroying the foundation upon which our laws are
built.
Such a valve is apparently needed, but the Court's decision to use the Takings
Clause as a source of economic rights may well inflict irreparable harm on the
written document. This method should be abandoned and replaced with a
familiar, albeit unpopular one: the Due Process Clause, which can better hold the
unenumerated economic rights envisioned by the Court in recent decisions
without doing permanent damage to the written text
ius honorarium. The ius ciile were the customary laws of Rome, which never changed, at least
in theory; the ius honorarium were the modifications made in the law by various quasi-judicial
officials, thepraetors and the aediles, so that the law could adapt to the problems created by the
introduction of non-Roman citizens into the Roman courts. See WOLFF, supra note 3, at 61-82.
162 Bruce Ackerman suggested just such a theory when he developed the concept of
"constitutional moments" in American history. These moments occur at times of great social
and political upheaval and require that the Constitution, or at least the conception of it, be
changed. Ackerman points to the re-definition of the Equal Protection Clause to strike down
segregation of African-Americans during the 1960s as one example of a judicially-achieved
"constitutional amendment' that would not, under our system's formal rules for amending the
Constitution, have been achieved. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991). This theory has not, in every case, been well received. See, e.g., Michael J. KIarman,
Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of
ConstitutionalMoments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992).
1999] 1137

